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Recessions are associated with both rising oil prices and increases in the federal funds rate.  Are 
recessions caused by the spikes in oil prices or by the sharp tightening of monetary policy?  This paper 

















 1. Introduction. 
Oil price increases have preceded every recession since 1971. Each of these 
recessions has also been preceded by an increase in the federal funds rate. (See Figure 1.)  
Are these recessions caused by the spikes in oil prices or by a sharp tightening of 
monetary policy?  How can we disentangle these two effects?  What does it mean to 
disentangle the two effects?  
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997, 2004), hereafter BGW, tried to answer 
these questions empirically using a VAR analysis.
1  Using Hamilton’s (1996) measure of 
oil price shocks, BGW (2004) report that a 10% oil price increase is associated with a 
150 basis point increase in the funds rate and a peak output decline of 0.7%.  Presumably 
this funds rate behavior reflects the endogenous tightening of policy in response to such 
an inflationary shock.  BGW use this VAR analysis to answer the following 
counterfactual question:  How much would output have declined if the funds rate had 
remained constant for, say, four quarters in the wake of the oil shock?   
BGW answer this question by adding unexpected monetary policy innovations to 
the VAR analysis of the exact magnitude needed to keep the funds rate stable in the wake 
of an oil shock.  Because this counterfactual experiment is related to previous work by 
other authors (Sims and Zha 1996), BGW call it the “Sims-Zha” experiment. The result 
of BGW’s (2004) Sims-Zha experiment was that if the Fed had kept the funds rate 
constant, output would have fallen by only about half of its actual decline. BGW thus 
conclude that the endogenous tightening of monetary policy accounted for a substantial 
portion of the negative impact of oil shocks on the economy.  
  1One potential problem with BGW’s Sims-Zha experiment is the Lucas critique: is 
the VAR stable under such changes in monetary policy?
2   BGW assert that “it seems 
plausible to us that a purely transitory deviation from the usual policy rule would not 
significantly affect the structure of the economy (that is, the quantitative effect of the 
Lucas critique should be small).”  This paper’s first contribution is to use the standard 
New-Keynesian model to assess the quantitative relevance of the Lucas critique. What 
would happen if these unanticipated policy shocks were actually anticipated? In contrast 
to the assertion of BGW, within this model the Lucas critique problem is quite severe. In 
particular, if the Sims-Zha experiment were anticipated by the public, then output would 
actually increase in the wake of an oil shock.  Hence, an anticipated version of Sims-Zha 
experiment would lead one to conclude that oil price shocks actually increase output. 
This conclusion brings up a broader question. What does it mean to keep policy 
constant?  The above results suggest that BGW’s experiment may not really be holding 
policy constant. The paper’s second contribution is therefore to expand this 
counterfactual question more broadly. To isolate the impact of an oil shock we need to 
ask what effect would oil have on the economy if monetary policy were constant or 
neutral.  But what exactly does “neutral” mean?  In addition to the Sims-Zha and 
anticipated Sims-Zha experiments, we consider several other alternatives including a 
money growth peg, an interest rate peg, and a “Wicksellian” interest rate policy.  The 
latter is a policy that adjusts the funds rate so that the real economy behaves as if there 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 There are, of course, numerous studies that analyze the effect of monetary shocks and oil shocks in 
isolation.  See BGW (1997) for references.   
2 The theoretical relevance of the critique is noted by BGW (1997, 2004) and Sims and Zha (1996).   
  2were no nominal rigidities.
3 The behavior of output and inflation are quite different under 
all of these possible versions of neutral policy.  
Leduc and Sill (2004) conduct a related analysis of systematic monetary policy 
and oil price shocks.  There are several relevant differences between their work and the 
current paper.  First, they do not consider the Sims-Zha experiment conducted by BGW, 
nor the quantitative significance of the Lucas Critique. Instead, their focus is entirely on 
systematic monetary policy. Second, while our analysis is built around a model with 
nominal rigidities, their principle focus is on a flexible price model with a limited 
participation constraint. They do report results with small nominal rigidities, an average 
contract duration of one quarter. We assume a longer contract duration, and also assume 
that capital is immobile across firms. Taken together, the nominal rigidities in our model 
are sixty times larger than in Leduc and Sill (2004). Third, Leduc and Sill (2004) also 
consider the case of an interest rate peg, but deal with the equilibrium determinacy 
problem in a way quite different than our approach, and this difference leads to 
quantitatively different conclusions. Finally they never consider a Wicksellian monetary 
policy. 
The next section outlines the basic model and clarifies the nature of the monetary 
experiments.  Section 3 and 4 present the principle results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Model. 
The theoretical model is a marriage of the now-standard Dynamic New Keynesian 
models of monetary policy (eg. Woodord (2003), Walsh (2003)), and the earlier real 
                                                           
3 The use of the modifier “Wicksellian” is suggested by Woodford (2003). 
  3business cycle models that explicitly included oil prices (eg., Kim and Loungani (1992)).  
In this section, we will sketch the basic framework.  The theoretical model consists of 
households and firms.  We present the decision problems of each in turn.   
 
Households. 
  Households are infinitely lived, discounting the future at rateβ .  Their period-by-
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The household begins period t with Mt cash balances and Bt-1 one-period nominal bonds 
that pay Rt-1 gross interest.  With wt denoting the real wage, Pt the price level, and Xt the 
time-t monetary injection, the household’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by 
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From equation (4), we have that the money demand curve is given by 
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so that the transactions elasticity is (σ/ε) and the interest elasticity is 1/ε.   
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that households are 
monopolistic suppliers of labor and that firms employ a CES aggregator of household 
labor with an elasticity of substitution equal to θw > 1.  In particular, the labor aggregator 




































.        (7) 
Nominal wages are adjusted as in Calvo (1983). In this case labor supply behavior is 
given by 
t t t t W Zh L C =
γ σ .            
             
For a given level of Zht, the Frisch labor supply elasticity is 1/γ.  The variable Zht is the 
monopoly distortion as it measures how far the household’s marginal rate of substitution 
is from the real wage. In the case of perfectly flexible but monopolistic wages, Zht = Zh 
is constant and less than unity. The smaller is Zh, the greater is the monopoly power. In 
the case of sticky nominal wages, Zht is variable and moves in response to the real and 
nominal shocks hitting the economy. Erceg et al. (2000) demonstrate that in log 
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  5where  is time-t net nominal wage growth,   denotes the log deviation from steady-
state, and 
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≡ , with  w η denoting the fraction of households that 
cannot adjust their nominal wages in the current quarter.
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Firms. 
  There are a continuum of firms producing different varieties of consumption 
goods (see the consumption aggregator (2)).  The typical firm utilizes labor services, , 
from households, and energy,  , from external sources to produce its unique final good 
using the CES technology:  
t L
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The typical firm has a fixed and immobile level of capital given by K = 1.  Labor input 
and energy is perfectly mobile across firms.  The real energy price is equal to   so that 
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The firm is a monopolistic producer of these goods, implying that labor will be paid 
below its marginal product.  Let Zt denote marginal cost so that we have 
     ) (t f Z w L t t =
) (t f Z P E t
e
t = . 
The variable Zt is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the firm’s marginal 
products differ from the real factor prices. In the case of perfectly flexible but 
                                                           
4 See page 224 of Woodford (2003) for details.   
  6monopolistic prices, Zt = Z is constant and less than unity. The smaller is Z, the greater is 
the monopoly power. In the case of sticky prices, Zt is variable and moves in response to 
the real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Yun (1996) demonstrates that in log 
deviations nominal price adjustment is given by: 
1 + + = t t t t E z π β λ π           
where t π is time-t nominal price growth (as a deviation from steady-state nominal price 
growth) lower case zt denotes the log deviation from steady-state, and 
) 1 (








≡ , with  p η denoting the fraction of firms that cannot adjust their 
nominal prices in the current quarter, and ϖ denoting the firm’s elasticity of marginal 
cost with respect to firm-level output.
5,6   
 
Monetary policy. 
For our first three experiments (baseline, unanticipated and anticipated Sims-Zha) 
we use a Taylor-type interest rate rule of the form: 
t t y t t y i η τ τπ + + = .  
                                                           
5 See page 224 of Woodford (2003) for details.   
6 Let V(Y,w,P
e) denote the firm’s cost function where the capital stock is fixed at unity.  ϖ  is the 
elasticity of VY with respect to Y, for a fixed level of wages and energy prices. 
  7where yt denotes log deviations in real output,  t π  is the linear deviation of inflation from 
its steady state, and η is an i.i.d. policy shock. 
 
Equilibrium. 
  There are four markets in this theoretical model: the labor market, the goods 
market, the bond market, and the money market. The respective market-clearing 
conditions include:    and  t
e
t t t En P Y C − = 0 = t B . The money market clears with the 
household holding the per capita money supply intertemporally. 
 
Calibration. 
  Before proceeding with the analysis, we need to set parameter values at levels 
consistent with empirical estimates for a quarterly model. Preference parameters are 
given by β = .99 (implying a 4% annual steady-state real rate of return), σ = 2, and γ = 3.  
The latter values are consistent with micro evidence of fairly inelastic savings and labor 
supply behavior. We set ε = 2 implying a unit transactions elasticity for money demand 
and an interest elasticity of -.5.
7 We set θw = 8 implying a steady-state mark-up of wages 
of 14%, and w η = 0.5 implying that wages are fixed on average for two quarters.   These 
choices imply λw = 0.020.   
  As for firms, the elasticity of substitution between oil and the capital-labor input 
is equal to 1/ρ.  Consistent with empirical estimates, we set this elasticity to .59, or ρ = 
1.7 (Kim and Loungani (1992)).  The share parameter a is set to a = .02. This implies a 
share of energy in total output of 4%.  The capital parameter in the production function is 
  8set to α = 1/3.  We set θp = 8 implying a steady-state mark-up of 14%, and  p η = 0.5 
implying that firms re-set prices on average every two quarters.   These choices imply ϖ  
= 0.46 and λp = 0.107.  Notice that the assumption of capital immobility leads to a 
relatively small value for λp. 
  Leduc and Sill (2004) model the nominal rigidities with a convex adjustment cost 
to nominal prices and wages.  Since all firms face symmetric adjustment costs, the issue 
of capital mobility is irrelevant as there is essentially a representative firm.  Leduc and 
Sill report that for technical reasons (see their footnote 15), they calibrate their model to 
imply very frequent price and wage adjustment, an average duration of 1.14 quarters for 
prices, 1.01 quarters for wages.  This short contract duration as well as the representative 
firm implies very little nominal rigidity.  For example, in our Calvo environment, the 
Leduc and Sill (2004) calibration corresponds to a price adjustment parameter of λp = 6.2, 
60 times larger than our calibrated value of λp = .107.   Their value of λp = 6.2 is quite 
close quantitatively to a flexible price model. 
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P p = and  e P  is the mean real price of oil since 1974. Estimating this 
process since 1974 yields a1 = 1.12 and a2 = -.15.  In all the experiments below we report 
impulse response functions for a one-time, exogenous 10% increase in the price of oil (νt 
= .10). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 This calibration is only relevant for the constant money growth experiment. 
  9The calibration of the Taylor rule comes from Kozicki (2002) who suggests that 
since 1983 the coefficients in this monetary policy rule are τ = 1.53 and τy = .27.   
   
3. Sims-Zha Experiments and the Lucas Critique. 
Recall that the Taylor-type interest rate rule is of the form: 
t t y t t y i η τ τπ + + = .  
For the baseline experiment, we set  t η =0.  In the (unanticipated) Sims-Zha experiment 
interest rates are held constant for 4 quarters or equivalently, 
   t y t t y τ τπ η − − = , for t = 1 to 4. 
Note the systematic surprises here: The Sims-Zha experiment assumes that households 
anticipate  t η  to be white noise when, in fact, it is a function of inflation and output.  In 
the anticipated Sims-Zha experiment the policy rule is given by  
  t t y t t y i η τ τπ + + =  
where ηj (for j = 1 to 4) are chosen to zero out the interest rate for four periods, but these 
values are forecastable by the public for j = 2 to 4. The public understands that for four 
quarters that monetary authority is going to deviate from the endogenous tightening under 
the Taylor rule and instead keep interest rates constant. 
  Figure 2 reports the impulse response functions for a 10% increase in the price of 
oil (ν = .10).  It is instructive to compare our baseline and unanticipated Sims-Zha 
numbers to those obtained by BGW in their econometric estimation. BGW estimated that 
a 10 percent oil price shock is associated with a 150 basis point increase in the funds rate 
and a peak output decline of 0.7%. Our model suggests that interest rates would increase 
  10by around 112 basis points and output would decline by 0.3%. Both estimates are 
somewhat smaller than estimated by BGW. However, the model predicts that this decline 
would essentially be cut in half under the Sims-Zha experiment (0.17% versus 0.3%). 
This is essentially the conclusion of BGW’s (2004) VAR analysis.    
  In all three scenarios there is a sustained decline in consumption and the real 
wage. This reflects the negative welfare consequences of the increase in the price of oil. 
The consumption decline is significantly mitigated for the first four quarters in the 
unanticipated and anticipated Sims-Zha experiments. This reflects the stimulative effect 
on output of the constant interest rate for these first four quarters.  This is especially 
pronounced in the anticipated Sims-Zha experiment. 
  But the magnitude of the Lucas Critique is quite clear.  In sharp contrast to 
BGW’s hunch, the Lucas effect is quantitatively relevant. If the stable interest rate had 
been anticipated, output would have increased by 0.23%!  Compared to the baseline 
interest rate movement, the anticipated decline in the interest rate (in the first four 
quarters) is much more simulative than the unanticipated decline in the interest rate. This 
arises because the anticipated interest rate stability leads to a much larger effect on 
inflation, and thus a larger decline in the real rate of interest. 
  When anticipated, the stimulative impact of lower interest rates are brought 
forward in comparison to the unanticipated Sims-Zha experiment. This implies that the 
level of consumption during the four quarters that interest rates are held constant is 
always higher for the anticipated experiment. The increase in consumption for the 
anticipated experiment implies that money growth must be higher to keep interest rates 
pegged during the first four quarters.  
  11  This result is reminiscent of recent Federal Reserve policy decisions. After 
decreasing the funds rate to an unprecedented 1 percent in June 2003, the FOMC 
introduced a dramatic change in language starting with the August 2003 meeting: “the 
Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable 
period.” The goal of this language was to condition expectations that the funds rate would 
stay unusually accommodative. It was believed that this would lead to higher inflation 
and output than if the same sequence of interest rates occurred, but were unanticipated.  
Here a series of announced shocks to keep interest rates from rising in response to oil 
price increases has a much bigger impact than a series of unanticipated shocks. 
 
4. Other Neutral Policies. 
  While the previous experiments provided potential answers to the question, “how 
would the economy have behaved if interest rates were kept constant in the wake of an oil 
shock,”, these experiments do not seem to answer the question originally posed by BGW: 
“how much of output’s decline in response to an oil price shock is due to oil and how 
much is due to monetary policy?” In fact the anticipated scenario suggests that oil’s 
impact on the economy would be positive! The next series of experiments try to answer 
BGW’s counterfactual question by asking how would the economy behaved in response 
to an oil price shock if monetary policy were neutral. The question then is what does it 
mean to keep monetary policy neutral? 
  The remaining monetary policy experiments do not have the form of a simple 
Taylor rule but are all plausible versions of neutral monetary policy.  One idea of neutral 
is a monetary policy rule that holds the labor market distortion (the “output gap”) 
  12constant,  . We call this the Wicksellian policy. 0 = + t t zh z
8  In this case, the impulse 
response functions are identical to the corresponding real business cycle model, i.e., a 
model with no nominal stickiness. These results are thus analogous to Kim and Loungani 
(1992).   
  Another candidate for neutral policy is where the money growth rate is held 
constant. In this case, the money demand curve is used to determine the endogenous 
behavior of the nominal interest rate. This is Leduk and Sill’s (2004) definition of neutral.  
  The final statement of neutral policy is an interest rate peg. In contrast to the 
previous experiments that held interest rates constant for four quarters, this is a rule in 
which interest rates are always constant and this behavior is anticipated. As is well-
known, there is real indeterminacy in this case.  The decision rules can be expressed as 
functions of two lags in the real wage, two lags of the exogenous oil price, and mean-zero 
sunspot shocks.  For the simulations below we eliminate the sunspot shock so that the 
impulse response functions represent fundamental behavior only, i.e., this is the 
minimum state vector (MSV) equilibrium. Below we will discuss Leduk and Sill’s (2004) 
alternative way of supporting the interest rate peg. 
  Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions for a 10% increase in the price of 
oil (ν = .10).  Since the Wicksellian policy causes real behavior to mimic the real 
business cycle model it is a natural place to start. The hump-shaped behavior in output 
and consumption reflect the hump-shape in oil prices. These dynamics in consumption 
                                                           
8 The Wicksellian policy is equivalent to a Taylor-type rule with a very large coefficient on the output gap. 
In this linearized model, this policy mimics the real behavior of the RBC model.  However, this policy is 
not optimal as it ignores the higher order losses due to Calvo pricing.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
nature of optimal policy is irrelevant. 
  13correspond to an initial decline in the real rate (-38 basis points), followed by a jump in 
the real rate above steady-state.   
  Note that output and consumption behavior for the Wicksellian policy are quite 
comparable to the benchmark Taylor-rule model. While the real behavior of the 
Wicksellian and benchmark Taylor-rule model are similar, the benchmark model delivers 
substantially more inflation than the Wicksellian rule. This occurs even though the spike 
in nominal interest rates is much greater under the benchmark Taylor-rule. The key to 
this puzzle lies in the real interest rate. In the earlier periods it is much lower (or more 
expansionary) for the Wicksellian policy but there is a very long-period of time in which 
it is slightly less expansionary than the benchmark Taylor-rule. Surprisingly this distant 
behavior is enough to drive the higher inflation rates observed under the benchmark rule. 
  If we accept the Wicksellian policy as “neutral” then the answer to the original 
counterfactual question is quite surprising. Despite the fact that interest rates in the 
baseline model increase over 100 basis points with respect to a 10 percent oil price shock, 
the real output response is very similar to Wicksell. This suggests that essentially all of 
output’s decline in the baseline Taylor rule scenario is due to oil.  
     Another interpretation of neutral policy is an interest rate peg. An interest rate peg 
leads to a sharp increase in the inflation rate and thus a decline in the real interest rate 
(142 basis points). The low real rate implies a surge in output, consumption, and 
inflation. The nominal rate peg is anticipated by the public so these results are a natural 
extension of the anticipated Sims-Zha experiment in which the interest rate is held 
constant for four quarters. The longer period of time (forever!) in which interest rates are 
held constant results in larger output gains for the interest rate peg (0.6%) compared to 
  14the anticipated Sims-Zha (0.22%) experiment. This version of neutral suggests that oil 
price increases have a stimulative impact on the economy.   
  Finally our last version of neutral is a constant money growth peg. The key 
observation with the money growth peg is that the decline in consumption leads to a 
decline in real money demand. Simultaneously the increased price level lowers the real 
money supply.  The consumption effect tends to lower interest rates, the price effect tends 
to increase interest rates.  For this calibration the consumption effect dominates so that 
the oil shock leads to an endogenous decline in the nominal interest rate. Despite this 
decline in interest rates, output and inflation are lower than with an interest rate peg. The 
reason is that while nominal interest rates are lower for a money growth peg, real interest 
rates are higher. 
  Both the interest rate peg and the money growth peg are more expansionary and 
lead to higher levels of output and consumption (relative to the baseline scenario) in the 
short run. A money growth peg suggests that a 10 percent oil shock would initially 
increase output slightly but then eventually lead to a 0.22 percent decline in GDP, slightly 
less than the immediate 0.30 percent decline predicted by the benchmark. 
  Table 1 summarizes the results of this section. We report the eight-quarter 
cumulative output decline from an oil price shock under alternative monetary policies. 
The second row of Table 1 measures the output decline relative to the output decline 
under the baseline Taylor rule.  This percentage can be viewed as the fraction of the 
output decline due to oil under various definitions of neutral monetary policy. For 
example, if the money growth peg is considered neutral, 1.23 percentage points of the 
1.61 percentage point decline in output is attributed to oil (76%), the remainder to non-
  15neutral monetary policy (24%).  However, if we define neutral as the Wicksellian policy, 
then the baseline monetary policy is stimulative so that over 100% of the output decline 
is a result of the oil shock. This implies that the baseline Taylor Rule formulation of 
monetary policy slightly off-sets oil price fluctuations in output compared to a RBC 
economy.   
  We report two versions of the interest rate peg. The first is the peg supported by 
the R = 0 policy rule in which we pick the MSV solution. This corresponds to the 
impulse response functions reported above. In this case the oil shock causes an output 
boom. If we treat this policy as neutral, the decline in output following an oil shock is 
entirely caused by the monetary tightening under the Taylor rule.   
  In contrast, Leduc and Sill (2004) the interest rate peg is supported by positing the 
following interest rate rule: 
  t y t t t y i i τ τπ ϕ + + = −1 , 
where τ and τy are very small and φ = 1.0001 (see their footnote 9). This policy rule 
implies equilibrium determinacy and near constancy of the interest rate in their model.  
(This is also the case in the model of this paper.)  If we model the interest rate peg as do 
Leduc and Sill (2004), then output falls with the oil shock. Because of space 
considerations we do not report these impulse response functions but do summarize the 
output behavior in Table 1. There are two peculiar characteristics of this rule. First, the 
decline in output is surprising given the results in the previous section for the anticipated 
Sims-Zha experiment. One interpretation of an interest rate peg is an infinitely-long 
anticipated Sims-Zha experiment. Second, although the realized interest rate process is 
constant, equilibrium determinacy results because the out-of-equilibrium behavior is 
  16explosive, φ > 1.  It is not clear that agents could learn φ since interest rates do not move 
in equilibrium. 
    
5. Conclusion. 
In two influential papers BGW (1997, 2004), tried to answer the question: how 
much of GDPs decline with respect to oil price increases is due to oil, and how much is 
due to the fact that interest rates also tend to rise sharply as well. They reported that a 
10% oil price increase is associated with a 150 basis point increase in the funds rate and a 
peak output decline of 0.7%.  BGW then use this VAR analysis to conclude that 
approximately half of this decline is due to oil and approximately half is due to the 
increase in the funds rate.  
The first contribution of this paper is to use the standard New Keynesian model to 
assess the accuracy of their hunch that the Lucas critique is not quantitatively relevant. 
We show that if interest rates were expected to be kept constant for four quarters that 
output would actually increase in the wake of an oil shock. Hence, within this theoretical 
model the Lucas critique is quantitatively relevant.  
While BGW designed a sensible experiment it is not clear that it really answers 
the posed question: holding monetary policy constant (or neutral) what impact would an 
oil price shock have on the economy? The paper’s second contribution is therefore to 
expand this counterfactual question more broadly. In addition to the Sims-Zha and 
anticipated Sims-Zha experiments, we consider several other versions of “neutral” policy 
including a money growth peg, an interest rate peg, and a “Wicksellian” interest rate 
  17policy.  The latter is a policy that adjusts the funds rate so that the real economy behaves 
as if there were no nominal rigidities.  
The behavior of output and inflation are quite different under all of these possible 
versions of neutral policy. But arguably the Wicksellian policy corresponds most closely 
with what is typically meant by a neutral policy as real behavior mimics the real business 
cycle model. In contrast to BGWs conclusion, this version of neutral suggests that all of 
the output decline associated with oil prices is due to oil, and none of the decline is 
attributable to monetary policy. 
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Wicksell  M Peg  R Peg*  R peg** 
8 q cum 
output 




Taylor rule  100%  108.79% 76.33%      NA  72.18% 
Row one is the eight quarter cumulative output decline under the corresponding policy rule.  The second 
row is the ratio of the output decline under a given policy rule relative to the output decline under the 
baseline Taylor rule.   
*The interest rate peg is defined as the policy rule R = 0 and the MSV solution that supports this peg.   
**The interest rate peg is defined as in Leduc and Sill (2004): 
t y t t t y i i τ τπ ϕ + + = −1 , with φ=1.0001, where τ 




























Q1:2005 Dollars per barrel Percent, quarterly average
 OIL PRICES AND EFFECTIVE  FEDERAL FUNDS RATE  
Effective Fed Funds rate
West Texas intermediate 
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